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TRUST AND COLLABORATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF CONFLICT: 
THE EFFECTS OF CONTRACT STRUCTURE 
 
Abstract. Leveraging a longitudinal dataset concerning 102 inter-firm disputes, we evaluate the 
effects of contract structure on trust and on the likelihood of continued collaboration. We 
theoretically refine and empirically extend prior research by (a) distinguishing between control 
and coordination functions of contracts, (b) separating goodwill-based and competence-based 
trust, and (c) evaluating the effects of contract structure on relational outcomes in the context of 
disputes. We find that control provisions increase competence-based trust, but reduce goodwill-
based trust, resulting in a net decrease in the likelihood of continued collaboration. Coordination 
provisions increase competence-based trust, leading to an increased likelihood of continued 
collaboration. 
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TRUST AND COLLABORATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF CONFLICT: 
THE EFFECTS OF CONTRACT STRUCTURE  
Inter-firm relationships allow firms to create value and build competitive advantage 
(Agarwal, Croson, & Mahoney, 2010), but cooperation in such relationships is neither automatic 
nor easily fostered. Two key impediments to cooperation are the threat of exploitation by an 
opportunistic exchange partner (Williamson, 1985) and the possibility of coordination failures 
that can derail the efforts of even well-intentioned parties (Gulati, Lawrence, & Puranam, 2005; 
Knez & Camerer, 2000). In recognition of the mixed-motive nature of most exchange 
relationships (e.g., Kogut, 1988), and of the inherent difficulty in coordinating expectations and 
action (Camerer, 2003), firms rely on contracts to mitigate their risks, facilitate coordination, and 
promote cooperation (Lusch & Brown, 1996; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). 
Despite the use of contracts to facilitate coordination and control, however, inter-firm 
disputes can emerge. This raises questions regarding the kind of relationship that will emerge, 
and the viability of continued collaboration, after parties have been unsuccessful in preventing 
conflict. In this paper, we examine these dynamics by evaluating how contract structure affects 
trust, and subsequently, the intent to continue collaboration, in the context of inter-firm disputes. 
We extend prior research on the effects of contracts on trust by (a) distinguishing the control vs. 
coordination function of contracts, (b) distinguishing the goodwill vs. competence dimensions of 
trust judgments, and (c) evaluating these relationships in the context of inter-firm conflict. 
 We argue that a more nuanced approach that considers the different functions of 
contracts—coordination vs. control—and the different dimensions of trust judgments—goodwill 
vs. competence—may provide a more complete assessment of the effects of contracts on trust 
and collaboration. Prior research has often focused narrowly on a subset of these distinctions, 
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and in some cases overlooked these distinctions altogether (Puranam & Vanneste, 2009). 
Furthermore, our analysis of firms’ willingness to continue a relationship after having suffered a 
costly dispute allows us to evaluate the mechanisms underlying an important, but rarely studied 
aspect of inter-firm exchange: relationship repair (Zaheer, Lofstrom, & George, 2002).  
 To test our hypotheses, we leverage a rich dataset comprising more than 150,000 pages of 
details regarding 102 business disputes arising in vertical exchange relationships in the years 
1991-2005. The data include a wide range of contractual and exchange characteristics for each 
relationship, along with thousands of pages of communication between the disputants. The 
contracts enable us to codify the degree to which control and coordination provisions were 
incorporated into the agreement, and the communications allow us to code for statements that 
reveal goodwill-based and competence-based trust in the relationship. This is notable because, to 
our knowledge, the current dataset is the first to provide this level of detail on inter-firm conflict, 
and the first to allow such a fine-grained analysis of trust in inter-organizational relationships.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Contracts as Instruments of Control and Coordination 
 Seminal works in organization studies (Barnard, 1938; Burns & Stalker, 1961), as well as 
work by legal scholars (e.g., Baird, Gertner, & Picker, 1994; McAdams, 2009), decision theorists 
(e.g., Luce & Raiffa, 1957; Schelling, 1963), and economists (e.g., Camerer, 2003; Knez & 
Camerer, 2000), have previously contemplated the distinction between control problems 
(stemming from misaligned incentives) and coordination problems (stemming from misaligned 
expectations and behavior) in exchange relationships (Gulati et al., 2005). While these two 
issues have often been tackled separately in the literature (Kretschmer & Puranam, 2008), some 
recent studies have suggested that organizational structures—and, in particular, inter-firm 
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contracts—serve the functions of both control and coordination (e.g., Argyres, Bercovitz, & 
Mayer, 2007; Mellewigt, Madhok, & Weibel, 2007; Reuer & Ariño, 2007; Salbu, 1997). 
 Organizational scholars have long considered the use of contracts as instruments of 
control (Macneil, 1978; Williamson, 1985; 1991). Inter-firm collaborations, have the potential of 
creating value, but parties to such relationships must contend with the risk of exploitation by 
their partners (Walker & Weber, 1984; Williamson, 1985). The legal underpinnings of contracts 
give firms the option of sanctioning an exchange partner who is unable or unwilling to abide by 
agreed upon terms (Joskow, 1987). The coordination function of contracts has received less 
attention (Argyres et al., 2007; Mayer & Argyres, 2004). A contract—and the contracting 
process—helps parties make explicit their assumptions and expectations regarding the 
transaction and each side’s role (Beatty & Samuelson, 2001; Smitka, 1994). Coordination-
oriented provisions in a contract are aimed at mitigating the risk that misunderstandings will 
disrupt collaboration among (presumably) well-intentioned parties (Macaulay, 1963). 
 In this paper, we build on the work of those who have called for a broader perspective on 
contractual complexity, and a more nuanced approach to studying the effects of contracts on 
relational attitudes and exchange outcomes (Mellewigt et al., 2007; Puranam & Vanneste, 2009). 
We evaluate contracts at the level of individual provisions, and distinguish between provisions 
aimed primarily at exerting control and those aimed primarily at facilitating coordination.  
Two Dimensions of Trust Judgments: Goodwill and Competence 
 Following Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer (1998), and consistent with other 
influential conceptualizations of trust (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998; Mayer, Davis, & 
Schoorman, 1995), we define trust as the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on positive expectations regarding the other party’s motivation and/or 
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behavior. Trust, so defined, can be distinguished from underlying dimensions of trust judgments, 
which entail attributions of the other party’s trustworthiness along relevant characteristics (e.g., 
integrity). Consistent with prior work on the attributional basis of trust (Ferrin & Dirks, 2003; 
Mayer et al., 1995; Weber, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2005) we posit that attributions along 
relevant dimensions are what create in the trustor a willingness to accept vulnerability.  
 We follow the lead of Nooteboom (1996) and Das & Teng (2001), who focus on two 
dimensions of trust judgments: “goodwill” and “competence.” Perceptions of goodwill entail 
attributions regarding the intention of the other party to behave in a trustworthy manner; 
perceptions of competence entail attributions regarding the other party’s ability to behave or 
perform as expected (Nooteboom, 1996).1  
The Effect of Contracts on Trust 
 Contracts and trust represent alternative means by which parties can manage risk in 
exchange relationships, but inter-firm relationships typically seek to use contracts while 
simultaneously attempting to build trust (Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Sitkin, 1995; Wicks, Berman, 
& Jones, 1999). The seemingly modal preference regarding inter-firm governance—to use 
contracts and build trust—has sparked a debate regarding the viability of this strategy. Some 
have argued that contracts and trust are often incompatible (Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002; 
Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 2000; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Others suggest that contracts and 
trust are not only compatible, but mutually reinforcing (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008; Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002). This divergence makes it difficult to predict whether an emphasis on contracts 
will enhance or inhibit the prospects for continued collaboration after a dispute. Our goal is not 
                                                 
1 This distinction captures all three dimensions in Mayer et al.’s (1995) trust framework: ability, benevolence, and 
integrity. Competence captures attributions of ability; goodwill captures benevolence and integrity. Combining 
benevolence and integrity as “goodwill” is useful because many of the statements in our data are hard to categorize 
as either benevolence or integrity attributions; many are ambiguous, or are suggestive of a dual attribution. 
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to reconcile the vast amount of prior research on this topic, nor do we align ourselves completely 
with either side. Rather, we borrow from both literatures in order to expound a more 
comprehensive (and nuanced) perspective on the effect of contracts on trust and collaboration in 
the aftermath of conflict. Our review of prior research suggests that both positive and negative 
effects of contracts can be better understood when we separately consider the effects of control 
vs. coordination provisions on goodwill- vs. competence-based trust.  
The Effect of Control Provisions on Trust 
 Those who have posited a negative relationship between contracts and trust have largely 
focused on the control function of contracts and on the goodwill dimension of trust (Bernheim & 
Whinston, 1998; Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002; Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 
1999). Macaulay (1963) and Ghoshal & Moran (1996) suggest that the mere suggestion or 
introduction of contracts may signal distrust of the other party’s intentions, thereby disrupting the 
process of trust development (Pillutla, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2003). Tenbrunsel & Messick 
(1999) argue that an over-reliance on control mechanisms changes the decision frame of 
exchange partners; including too many control provisions may, ironically, promote opportunistic 
behavior by inducing a “business” rather than “ethical” framing of the interaction. Finally, 
Malhotra & Murnighan (2002) argue that overly controlling contracts, which leave little room for 
discretion, crowd out trust development because they lead to situational rather than personal 
attributions for the cooperativeness of partners. This may be especially likely during conflict, 
because parties are less likely to make generous attributions of each other’s behavior when the 
relationship has turned antagonistic (Ross & Stillinger, 1991). These mechanisms suggest:  
Hypothesis 1. The higher the number of control provisions in a contract, the lower the 
subsequent level of goodwill-based trust. 
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Prior research has not directly examined the effect of control provisions on competence-
based trust. However, there are two reasons to expect that control provisions will enhance 
perceptions of competence in the context of disputes. First, by eliminating incentives for 
cheating and reneging, control provisions may force parties to focus more time and effort on 
their roles and responsibilities. This “substitution effect” away from nefarious conduct may 
promote exactly the types of behavior (e.g., attention to detail, timeliness, etc.) that enhance 
competence attributions. Another possibility is that the time spent on drafting contractual 
language, even for control provisions, leads to a clarification of expectations and assumptions, 
which in turn facilitates competence attributions (Argyres et al., 2007; Mayer & Argyres, 2004). 
We therefore hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 2. The higher the number of control provisions in a contract, the higher the 
subsequent level of competence-based trust. 
The Effect of Coordination Provisions on Trust 
 In addition to serving a control function, contracts provide a means by which parties can 
coordinate their expectations and efforts (Gulati et al., 2005; Mayer & Argyres, 2004; Reuer & 
Ariño, 2007). As a result, common knowledge structures such as shared language and routinized 
interactions emerge that make it easier for parties to communicate their ability to meet each 
other’s needs (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006). The process of 
coordination can thus facilitate competence-based trust development. In their analysis of 11 
contracts signed between two firms, Mayer & Argyres (2004: 400) provide a relevant example: 
“HW Inc. had expressed frustration in the first two projects over the length of time it took 
Softstar to complete what HW Inc. perceived to be minor changes…Softstar added a system 
architecture section to the third [contract]. This section allowed both firms to better understand 
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how the entire product fit together and the impact to Softsar if HW Inc. made a late hardware 
change.” In this incident, the revised contract was aimed at aligning expectation regarding the 
link between change requests and delays, lest HW Inc. attribute delays to Softstar’s 
incompetence. Coordination structures may be especially important for competence perceptions 
after a conflict has arisen, because disputing parties are unlikely to otherwise engage in the kinds 
of spontaneous communication that mitigate conflict and promote positive attributions (Hinds & 
Mortensen, 2005). This suggests: 
Hypothesis 3. The higher the number of coordination provisions in a contract, the 
higher the subsequent level of competence-based trust. 
Coordination provisions are also expected to increase goodwill-based trust in the context 
of disputes. By creating channels through which differences in perspective will be resolved, 
coordination provisions help mitigate misunderstandings of the kind that raise questions about 
the intent of the other party; this promotes—or at least minimizes damage to—attributions of 
goodwill during a conflict (Vlaar, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2007). Moreover, parties that 
establish norms and procedures that allow them to coordinate on when and how to expend effort 
in the relationship will be less likely to face situations where one party feels over-worked or 
exploited, or is concerned that the other side is not meeting its reciprocal obligations (Malhotra, 
2004). Evidence from the laboratory supports this. Ahn, Ostrom, Schmidt, Shupp, & Walker 
(2001) find that prior experience in a pure coordination game (with no incentives for non-
cooperation) helps parties to coordinate towards a mutually cooperative outcome even in 
subsequent interactions that provide incentives for non-cooperation. This suggests: 
Hypothesis 4. The higher the number of coordination provisions in a contract, the 
higher the subsequent level of goodwill-based trust. 
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Trust and Consequences 
 The considerable research attention devoted to the effect of contracts on trust reveals the 
extent to which trust is seen as crucial for inter-firm collaboration and value creation (Arrow, 
1974; Uzzi, 1997), and as a source of competitive advantage for organizations (Barney & 
Hansen, 1994; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). In this paper, we consider a consequence of trust that 
has received little direct attention, but which is critical to the value-creating potential of inter-
firm relationships: the willingness to continue the relationship after a dispute has arisen. We 
expect that contractual provisions aimed at coordination and control will influence competence- 
and goodwill-based trust, which will in turn influence the decision of whether to stay together or 
end a relationship that has experienced conflict. Thus, our data allows us to begin the process of 
linking contract choices with relational outcomes, with trust serving as a mediator.  
 Zand (1972) suggests that goodwill-based trust will increase the likelihood of continued 
collaboration because it leads parties to share accurate and timely information and to be more 
willing to accept dependence on each other even when formal control mechanisms cannot be 
applied. Zand (1972) also finds that a high degree of goodwill-based trust increases motivatation 
to implement agreements and makes parties less likely to switch partners. Research on the role of 
psychological contracts also shows the positive effect of goodwill-based trust on relationship 
continuance (Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Robinson, 1996). In inter-firm contexts, Uzzi (1997) 
argues that (goodwill-based) trust is a crucial predictor of future exchange. This suggests: 
Hypothesis 5. The higher the level of goodwill-based trust in a relationship, the higher 
the willingness to continue a relationship after a dispute has arisen. 
 Competence-based trust should also increase the likelihood of continuing a relationship. 
It is perhaps axiomatic that parties will prefer to do business with those they consider to be 
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competent. In the aftermath of conflict, the importance of competence-based trust should be even 
greater. Das & Teng (2001: 266) argue that “the lower the level of acceptable performance risk 
level, the higher the needed competence trust level.” Parties exiting a dispute will be especially 
sensitive to the degree of performance risk involved in continuing the relationship. This suggests: 
Hypothesis 6. The higher the level of competence-based trust in a relationship, the higher 
the willingness to continue a relationship after a dispute has arisen. 
Contracts and the Continuation of Relationships after a Dispute 
We expect that control provisions, by reducing goodwill-based trust, should lessen the 
likelihood that disputing parties will agree to continue working together. If a dispute arises 
despite reliance on provisions designed to protect against opportunism, parties are likely to 
seriously question the viability of future exchange. The prospects for continued collaboration are 
even dimmer if control provisions do not simply substitute for goodwill-based trust, but actually 
undermine it (Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002). On the other hand, control provisions may increase 
the desire for continued exchange due to an increase in competence-based trust. If control 
provisions crowd out self-serving behavior in favor of task-oriented activity, this should increase 
competence perceptions and make future collaboration more attractive.  
The net effect of enchanced control on future collaboration depends on whether the effect 
of goodwill-based trust or competence-based trust dominates. We expect that the negative effect 
will dominate. Prior research suggests that strained relationships are more difficult to repair 
when there has been a breach of goodwill-based trust rather than of competence-based trust 
(Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006). Moreover, after the dispute, goodwill-based trust is likely 
to be more important than competence-based trust for resurrecting the scarred relationship: even 
if there remain concerns about the partner’s ability to meet all of its obligations, the scope of the 
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relationship can be redefined to focus on areas where competence is not in question; in contrast, 
concerns about the other’s goodwill are unlikely to be limited to a single domain, making it 
difficult to rekindle the relationship (Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004). We therefore suggest: 
Hypothesis 7a. The higher the number of control provisions in a contract the lower the 
willingness to continue the relationship after a dispute has arisen. 
Hypothesis 7b. The effect of control provisions on relationship continuance is mediated 
by the level of goodwill-based trust. 
Hypothesis 7c. The effect of control provisions on relationship continuance is mediated 
by the level of competence-based trust. 
Meanwhile, coordination provisions, by increasing goodwill-based trust, will facilitate 
continued exchange. Recent case studies point to a mutually reinforcing relationship between 
coordination, goodwill-based trust, and relationship development (Faems, Janssens, Madhok, & 
Van Looy, 2008; Mayer & Argyres, 2004; Ness, 2009): relationship development facilitates 
more efficient contracting aimed at better coordination; better coordination facilitates 
cooperation; and increased cooperation facilitates goodwill-based trust and relationship 
development. Coordination provisions should be especially important in the context of disputes: 
parties may question the usefulness of coordination provisions that failed to prevent a dispute, 
but if coordination provisions have facilitated goodwill-based trust in the interim, this will 
provide a basis on which to rebuild the relationship. Coordination provisions should also 
facilitate relationship continuance due to an increase in competence-based trust. As the 
relationship continues, parties learn more about the types of contingencies that can arise, which 
leads to the development of additional coordination provisions aimed at improving the working 
arrangement (cf., Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1994). Thus, as time goes on, coordination provisions 
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not only allow parties to make fewer mistakes and appear more competent (as in Hypothesis 3), 
but also to increase the domain of tasks in which they can demonstrate competency (Argyres et 
al., 2007). Both of these effects should faciliate continued collaboration. This suggests: 
Hypothesis 8a. The higher the number of coordination provisions in a contract the 
greater the willingness to continue the relationship after a dispute has arisen. 
Hypothesis 8b. The effect of coordination provisions on relationship continuance is 
mediated by the level of goodwill-based trust. 
Hypothesis 8c. The effect of coordination provisions on relationship continuance is 
mediated by the level of competence-based trust. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Data 
We were granted access to all legal files concerning contract disputes handled by one law 
firm in Western Europe between 1991 and 2005. This mid-sized law firm is a generalist in the 
field of corporate law; its clients include small, mid-size and large firms from a variety of 
industries. We restricted our sample to all two-party disputes involving vertical relationships; 
these represented 80 percent of all two-party disputes handled by the firm. Our sample consists 
of 102 cases (i.e., disputes), 99 of which involved only European firms; each of the other three 
involved at least one non-European firm. Because some companies were repeat clients and 
involved in more than one dispute, the sample contained 178 different firms.2 To check for 
selection bias, differences were examined between included and excluded files (i.e., those 
                                                 
2 The results were unchanged when a “repeat client” control variable was included in the analyses. 
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involving non-vertical relationship). We found no significant differences on any dimension that 
we could observe (contractual complexity, firm size, etc.).3 
Each legal file contained between 800 and 5,000 pages and included (a) the original 
contract, along with any contract revisions that were made prior to the dispute, and (b) all 
documents exchanged during the dispute-resolution process. In addition, the lawyers in each case 
obtained from the clients all potentially relevant information related to the initial context of the 
relationship, the origins of the conflict, and its progression over time. In total, over 150,000 
pages of documents were collected and analyzed for this study. Data collection took place over 
four months. The law firm did not allow us to contact the disputing firms directly.  
The firms in our sample came from a variety of industries: manufacturing (52 percent), 
services (32 percent), retail (15 percent) and construction (2 percent). There were four types of 
contracts: distribution (35.3 percent), production supply (29.4 percent), IT (26.5 percent), and a 
smaller number of contracts for consulting and other services (8.8 percent). 46 percent of the 
cases involved cross-border relationships. 65.7 percent of the contracts were time-bound in that 
they stipulated a pre-specified end to the relationship. 32.4 percent of the cases included 
exchange partners that had interacted with each other previously.  
Dependent Variable 
Intent to Continue 
We analyze the intent of the parties to continue their relationship after the dispute is 
resolved. For multiple reasons, this performance variable is especially relevant when considering 
                                                 
3 Because all of our relationships involve legal disputes, we evaluated the representativeness of our sample—at the 
contract level and relationship level—relative to the broader universe of inter-firm relationships. On Parkhe’s (1993: 
829) unweighted index of contractual complexity—which tabulates the presence of up to eight key contractual 
clause categories—our sample’s score (4.36) is situated comfortably between the score (3.69) for Reuer & Ariño’s 
(2002) sample and the score (5.05) of Reuer, Ariño, & Mellewigt’s (2006) sample. At the relationship level, the 
percentage of prior ties among firms in our sample (32.4 percent) is within the range observed in prior research: 12 
percent in Gulati (1995b); 20 percent in Reuer & Ariño (2002); 53 percent in Hagedoorn & Hesen (2009).  
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the effects of contract structure on trust in the context of conflict. First, the strategic alliance 
literature has traditionally sought to investigate factors that contribute to alliance survival 
(Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004; Park & Russo, 1996) and stability (Blodgett, 1992; Inkpen & 
Beamish, 1997). Second, an analysis of the parties’ intent to continue collaborating after a 
dispute has arisen responds to the call by trust researchers to examine when and how damaged 
relationships can be repaired (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002; Dirks, Lewicki, & 
Zaheer, 2009). Finally, this measure provides a more direct measure of the consequences of trust 
than would be provided by some (eventual) financial measure of performance.  
We examined the messages that were exchanged between the parties, as well as the terms 
of the settlement/judgment recorded in the legal files, to look for indications of a willingness to 
continue with the relationship. Such intent was sometimes manifested in a direct communication 
between the firms (e.g., “I hope we have clarified and overcome this ‘misunderstanding’ and we 
can now continue our fruitful collaboration on a sound basis.”) In other cases, it was made 
evident through the crafting of a new agreement by the parties. For example, in one case, the 
following clause was added to the contract: “Addendum to Clause 14: The Parties thereby agree 
that [Firm A] and [Firm B] shall now each conduct by the end of each month review of the 
progress made […] The Agreement is thereby extended for a 2 (two)-year period.” We coded as 
“no intent to continue” those cases in which either or both parties explicitly stated no willingness 
to continue the relationship (e.g., “You should perfectly understand that we have put an end to 
our collaboration.”), or when there was an absence of an indication to continue the relationship. 
Intent to continue the relationship was indicated in 29 cases out of 102.  
Independent Variables 
Control vs. Coordination Provisions 
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Our codification of contract provisions as control- vs. coordination-oriented was based on 
existing research (e.g., Parkhe, 1993; Reuer & Ariño, 2007), and supplemented with extensive 
interviews of legal experts specializing in contract law. We conducted a total of seventeen 
interviews with three practicing lawyers and seven professors in contract law. Interviews lasted 
between 1.5 and 3 hours. The experts examined both the codification scheme we had prepared 
based on the literature, and a sample of contracts from our dataset. The experts then offered an 
evaluation of the coding scheme and proposed some changes, which we implemented. Here, 
more precisely, is the method we followed in coding our contract provisions:  
Step 1: Codification based on prior research. We relied upon a set of indicators 
developed by Parkhe (1993) that are designed to evaluate various provisions in formal contracts. 
Parkhe (1993: 829) identified the following eight key provisions that might be included in a 
contract: (1) the exchange of periodic written reports of all relevant transactions; (2) prompt 
written notice of any departures from the agreement; (3) the right to examine and audit all 
relevant records through a firm of CPAs; (4) designation of certain information as proprietary 
and subject to confidentiality provisions of the contract; (5) non-use of proprietary information 
even after termination of agreement; (6) termination of agreement clauses; (7) arbitration 
clauses; and (8) lawsuit provisions. Reuer & Ariño (2007) factor analyzed the inclusion of 
Parkhe’s eight provisions in an analysis of 88 strategic alliances and found that the first three 
provisions of Parkhe’s 8-item index relate primarily to coordination, whereas the remaining five 
relate primarily to enforcement (what we call control). They therefore measured Coordination 
Provisions as the number of coordination-related clauses included in the contract (i.e., clauses 1, 
2, and/or 3 from Parkhe (1993)), yielding an integer variable ranging from 0 to 3; Control 
17 
 
 
Provisions was measured as the number of control-related clauses in the contract (i.e., clauses 4, 
5, 6, 7 and/or 8 from Parkhe (1993)) to obtain a score ranging from 0 to 5.  
The coding of our contracts for control vs. coordination provisions was done by (i) one of 
the authors and (ii) a faculty member with a degree in law who was unaware of the hypotheses or 
the purpose of the study. To further eliminate the possibility of bias, all coding of contracts was 
done prior to any analysis of dispute-related data (e.g., trust messages, intent to continue, etc.). 
Pairwise correlation among raters for the coding of control-related provisions (r = 0.911; p < 
0.001) and for coordination-related provisions (r = 0.923; p < 0.001), along with high 
Cronbach’s alphas (0.953 and 0.959, respectively), confirm the reliability of the coding. Any 
disagreements on coding were resolved by discussion. 
Step 2: Revisions based on expert advice. In order to evaluate and refine our coding 
scheme, we presented the scheme, as well as a sample of real contracts, to a set of legal experts. 
These interviews yielded two primary results. First, the legal experts supported our general 
approach to codification, stating that contract provisions could be meaningfully distinguished as 
being focused primarily on control versus coordination. Second, the legal experts expressed 
concerns with two clause categories from Reuer & Ariño’s (2007) coding framework. 
Specifically, the experts argued that clause category 3 (regarding the right to examine and audit 
all relevant records through a firm of CPAs) did not clearly represent a coordination function. In 
addition, the legal experts suggested that clause category 7 (regarding arbitration clauses) was 
ambiguous because such provisions may not serve a clear control function. Based on this advice, 
we revised our categorization scheme such that our measure of Coordination Provisions would 
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be based on clauses 1 and 2 from Parkhe (1993) and our measure of Control Provisions would be 
based on clauses 4, 5, 6, and 8 from Parkhe (1993).4,5  
Robustness checks. The results below are based on the measures of coordination and 
control provisions derived by the two-step process described above. In addition, we conducted 
two robustness checks of our results. In the first set of analyses, we used the initial (Step 1) 
Reuer & Ariño (2007) coding framework for our measures of coordination and control 
provisions. The findings based on this eight-clause analysis strongly converge with the results 
reported below (results available on request). In the second set of analyses, we added an 
interpretive (coding) step to the Step 1 categorization, in which a rater evaluated each provision 
in every contract of the dataset for seeming ambiguity of intent (Hagedoorn & Hesen, 2009). All 
clauses that seemed ambiguous as to (coordination vs. control) function were then eliminated.To 
test the reliability of this elimination procedure, a second rater evaluated 10 randomly selected 
clauses for each of the 8 types of provisions; the level of agreement was 91.25%. This process 
yielded more conservative measures in which we deleted 5.96% of the coordination provisions 
and 12.42% of the control provisions. The results based on these measures were also consistent 
with our primary (reported) analyses, with no differences in the tests of our hypotheses. 
Together, these two robustness checks provide confidence in our reported analyses.  
Mediator Variables 
Competence-Based Trust and Goodwill-Based Trust 
In order to assess the level of trust between the parties during the conflict, every 
communication (paper or electronic) exchanged between the disputing firms during the entire 
resolution process was analyzed. The choice not to reply to a communication by the other party 
                                                 
4 A confirmatory factor analysis confirms that the revised scheme improves on Parkhe’s (1993) eight-clause coding. 
5 Following Lui & Ngo (2004) and Barthélemy & Quélin (2006), we use unweighted composite indices. 
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was also coded as a (“no reply”) message. In total, 2,293 messages were studied (of which only 
132 were coded as “no reply”). A scheme for categorizing statements as relating to competence- 
and/or goodwill-based trust (or neither) was constructed to evaluate each message (see below for 
more details). We allowed each message to be coded as signaling neither, one, or both types of 
trust. After an evaluation of all documents in a given dispute, the ratio of competence-based trust 
messages to total messages was calculated, and served as a measure of the degree of 
competence-based trust. Likewise, the ratio of goodwill-based trust messages to total messages 
served as a measure of the degree of goodwill-based trust. Thus, the score on each variable can 
vary between 0 (i.e., a complete absence of this type of trust) and 1 (i.e., all the messages 
exchanged between the partners conveyed this type of trust). 
Coding of messages was done by a team of two researchers: one is a co-author of this 
paper and the other is a colleague (with a law degree) who was unaware of the hypotheses or the 
topic of research. We followed the coding procedure developed by Weber (1990: 21-24), which 
includes the following steps: defining the message as our unit of analysis; developing a list of 
relevant preliminary response categories; applying the coding scheme to a subsample (four 
cases); assessing and revising the coding rules as a result; having both raters independently read 
and code each message in the dataset.6 The percent of agreement between raters (97 percent for 
competence-based trust and 95 percent for goodwill-based trust) and the pairwise correlation 
between raters (r = 0.948, p < 0.01 for competence-based and r = 0.939, p < 0.01 for goodwill-
based trust) were high. Any disagreements were resolved through discussion. (See Appendix A 
for examples of statements that were coded as competence-based trust and goodwill-based trust.) 
Control Variables 
                                                 
6 We did this based on the item selection and classification process outlined by Jauch, Osborn, & Martin (1980). 
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 Asymmetry of Revenue. We controlled for power asymmetry between the parties using 
firm revenues as a proxy for firm strength. Asymmetry is necessary to control because it may 
affect the likelihood that the parties include coordination and/or control provision in the contract. 
Asymmetry was measured as: log [ABS [(Revenue of Firm A)-(Revenue of Firm B)]. Revenue 
was measured in thousands of inflation-adjusted Euros for the year when the contract was 
signed. These data were obtained from the Bureau van Dijk’s ORBIS database. 
Type of Dispute. We evaluated the nature of the dispute as described by the disputants 
(Weaver & Dickson, 1998) at the outset. Disputes could be meaningfully distinguished as 
disagreements regarding the nature of the transaction (30.4 percent) or as a perceived failure on 
the part of one party to meet payment, delivery, or other clear objectives (69.6 percent). Type of 
Dispute takes the value of 1 in disputes regarding the nature of the transaction; 0 otherwise.7 
Type of Settlement. We controlled for the type of resolution that was eventually pursued 
(litigation vs. private settlement) because the anticipation of this eventuality may have influenced 
the parties’ willingness to make statements that admit to the other party’s trustworthiness (or lack 
thereof). Type of Settlement takes the value of 0 if the dispute was eventually settled through 
litigation and the value of 1 if the dispute was eventually settled via private negotiation. 
Prior Ties. To mitigate endogeneity concerns regarding the relationship between contract 
provisions and trust, we controlled for pre-existing trust. Following Gulati (1995a), we used the 
existence of prior ties as a proxy. We then improved on this measure by coding whether the 
previous transactions (if any) were viewed positively or negatively by the parties. Based on prior 
research on satisfaction with trading partners (Heide & John, 1992; Jap & Ganesan, 2000), files 
                                                 
7 It is arguable that disagreements regarding the nature of the transaction seem like coordination problems, and that 
failure to meet objectives is a control problem. We pursued this intriguing possibility with supplemental analyses to 
test whether (a) Type of Dispute was predicted by our Control or Coordination IVs, and (b) Type of Dispute 
interacted with Control or Coordination IVs to predict Intent to Continue. Neither test produced significant results.  
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with messages that explicitly referenced norms of flexibility, participation, and/or solidarity were 
coded as positive prior ties; files referencing inflexibility, non-participation, and/or individualism 
in prior interactions were coded as negative prior ties. Two dummy variables were created: 16.67 
percent of relationships were coded as having Positive Prior Ties; 12.74 percent had Negative 
Prior Ties. When there was no prior tie (67.65 percent), or if there was no reference to positive 
or negative perceptions (2.94 percent), both variables took on a value of 0. 
Prior Relationship Length. We controlled for the length of the prior relationship because 
a lengthy interaction history may help parties build trust (Kramer, 1999). As such, controlling for 
prior relationship length helps to further mitigate endogeneity concerns. Also, organizations 
interacting repeatedly may learn from prior experiences, allowing contracts to be specified in 
greater detail (Mayer & Argyres, 2004; Vanneste & Puranam, 2010). We measured the amount 
of time for which the firms transacted prior to engaging in the transaction that led to the current 
conflict (Argyres et al., 2007; Dekker, 2008) as ln (number of days + 1). The mean prior 
relationship length was 942 days for the 33 cases where firms had prior ties. 
Revisions to the Initial Contract. In 10.8 percent of cases, the contract in place at the 
outset of the dispute was not identical to the original contract that was signed by the parties. 
Amendments over time might indicate recurrent conflict—or, to the contrary, the ability of 
parties to cooperatively reengage to improve the relationship (Mayer & Teece, 2008; Reuer & 
Ariño, 2002). As such, we controlled for whether the contract had been revised previously, prior 
to the current conflict.8 (We did not observe any revisions during the dispute period itself.)  
Asymmetry of Alternatives. Even parties that have low levels of trust may decide to 
continue collaborating if they have few viable alternatives. Given our dyad-level outcome 
                                                 
8 We conducted an additional analysis at the provision level and found that 96.1 percent of the control provisions 
and 94.4 percent of the coordination provisions were in the contracts from the beginning of the transaction. 
Including controls for changes made at the provision level did not change any of the results. 
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variables, we controlled for outside alternatives by evaluating the degree of asymmetry between 
the parties’ alternatives, as well as the sum of their alternatives. To approximate the number of 
alternatives each party may have to dealing with the other, we content analyzed the 
communications to look for mentions of alternative options and/or partners (e.g., “You know that 
if you continue to deny the facts, we will turn to [Firm X] to supply this part;” “If we aren’t able 
to put this relationship on the right track, we will produce the [part] ourselves.”). Because the 
text did not allow us to calculate the precise number of each party’s alternatives, we estimated 
the strength of one’s alternatives based on the frequency with which the party mentioned 
alternatives. Asymmetry of alternatives was measured as: [ABS [(# of references to alternatives 
by Firm A)-(# of references to alternatives by Firm B)]. 
Sum of Alternatives. We evaluated “mutual dependence” by calculating the sum of each 
party’s alternatives. A higher value indicates that the parties have strong alternatives to dealing 
with each other, (i.e., a lower degree of mutual dependence). 
Other Factors. The following variables were tested in a supplemental set of tests for our 
hypotheses, but dropped from the analyses reported below because they did not have any 
significant effects in any of the analyses: industry (e.g., manufacturing), type of transaction (e.g., 
distribution contract), international (i.e., whether the transaction entailed a cross-border 
relationship), time bound (i.e., a dichotomous variable capturing whether the initial contract had 
a specified end time), technical detail (i.e., the level of complexity of the transaction), stakes 
(i.e., the amount of money involved in the contract), and geographic distance between the firms.  
ANALYSES 
Regressions were used to test the impact of contractual provisions on the level of each 
type of trust (Hypotheses 1 to 4). As some companies were repeat clients in our sample, which 
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may result in correlated residuals across observations, we report results with robust standard 
errors clustered on firms (76 clusters). When intent to continue the relationship, a binary 
variable, served as the dependent measure (Hypotheses 5 to 8), we used probit models. As a 
robustness check, we also used logit models for these analyses; results were identical. 
Hypotheses 7b, 7c, 8b, and 8c predicted mediated relationships. To test for mediation, we 
followed the procedure outlined by Baron & Kenny (1986). Mediation is supported if: (1) the IV 
significantly predicts the DV, (2) the IV significantly predicts the MV (mediator), (3) the MV 
significantly predicts the DV, and (4) when the IV and MV are simultaneously included in the 
analysis, the MV is a significant predictor, but the IV is less (or no longer) significant.  
Any such study will raise the issue of potential endogeneity. It is worth noting, however, 
that although regression analysis cannot evaluate temporal causality, our data suggest that a 
temporal sequence is in play. The data on contract provisions and transaction attributes is based 
on information that predates the onset of the dispute (T=1). The data on goodwill- and 
competence-based trust is based on messages exchanged at a later time (T=2), after the onset of 
the conflict. Finally, the intent to continue the relationship is manifested at the end of the dispute 
resolution process (T=3). In addition, we try to address this issue of alternative relationships by 
including a host of control variables (described above) that may influence initial contract 
structure, most notably the existence and influence of pre-existing trust (measured both by the 
length of prior ties as well as with measures of the quality of prior ties). Finally, as an additional 
robustness check, we conducted a supplemental analysis aimed at mitigating, to the degree 
possible, concerns regarding whether prior relationships (and prior trust, specifically) influenced 
the types of contractual clauses. In this analysis, we eliminated all 32.35 percent of relationships 
that contained any prior ties. The results are consistent with those of our core analyses, again 
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suggesting that endogeneity concerns are perhaps not problematic for our results. 
RESULTS 
Inter-firm relationships varied in the degree to which they included coordination vs. 
control provisions in the contract. The mean number of coordination provisions was 0.99 (out of 
2) and the mean number of control provisions was 2.30 (out of 4). Table 1 provides summary 
statistics and Pearson correlations for the variables in our analysis. Because some variables were 
significantly correlated, we checked for multicollinearity problems. The variance inflation 
factors (VIF) range from 2.47 to 4.70, diminishing this concern (Chatterjee & Price, 1991). 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Table 2 displays the first set of results in which goodwill-based trust and competence-
based trust are regressed on contractual provisions (control vs. coordination). As predicted by 
Hypothesis 1 (Table 2, Model 1d), controlling for attributes of the transaction, of the dispute, and 
of the relationship, the higher the level of control provisions, the lower the level of goodwill-
based trust (β = -.05; p < 0.001). We also find (Table 2, Model 2d) that control provisions 
positively influence competence-based trust (β = .06; p < 0.001), supporting Hypothesis 2. As 
predicted by Hypothesis 3, increasing the coordination provisions of a contract results in an 
increase in competence-based trust (β = .16; p < 0.001; Table 2, Model 2d). However, 
Hypothesis 4, which predicted that an increase in coordination provisions would result in an 
increase in goodwill-based trust was not supported (Table 2, Model 1d). 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
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Table 3 shows the results of binomial probit regressions in which the dichotomous 
dependent variable is Intent to Continue. A positive coefficient indicates an increased likelihood 
of continuing the relationship. Consistent with our predictions, we find (Table 3, Model 3d) that 
both goodwill-based trust (β = 17.07; p < 0.001) and competence-based trust (β = 9.45; p < 0.01) 
positively impact the intent to continue, supporting Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6, respectively. 
We also predicted that the greater the level of control provisions, the less likely it would 
be that the parties would intend to continue the relationship (Hypothesis 7a), and that this effect 
would be mediated by goodwill-based (Hypothesis 7b) and competence-based trust (Hypothesis 
7c). Consistent with Hypothesis 7a (Table 3, Model 4c), the higher the number of control 
provisions, the lower the likelihood of continuing the relationship (β = -.62; p < 0.01).  
The mediation predictions of Hypotheses 7b and 7c require multiple tests (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986). We have already shown that control provisions predict goodwill-based trust and 
competence-based trust. We have also shown that goodwill-based trust and competence-based 
trust are positively related to the intent to continue. Finally, consistent with Hypothesis 7b, when 
we simultaneously include control provisions (the IV) and goodwill-based trust (the MV) as 
predictors of intent to continue (Table 3, Model 5a), goodwill-based trust is still a significant 
predictor (β = 12.93; p < 0.001), but control provision is no longer significant (β = -.15; ns), 
suggesting full mediation. To evaluate the mediation effect, we conducted a Sobel test (Sobel, 
1982), which computes a Z-value to assess whether the indirect effect of the IV on the DV 
through the mediator is significantly different from zero. The Sobel test confirmed the mediating 
effect of goodwill-based trust between control provisions and the intent to continue (z = -2.718; p 
< 0.01). In contrast, when we simultaneously include control provisions (the IV) and 
competence-based trust (as the MV) as predictors of intent to continue (Table 3, Model 5b), both 
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variables—competence-based trust (β = 11.90; p < 0.001) and control provisions (β = -2.11; p < 
0.001)—remain highly significant, suggesting no support for the mediation predicted in 
Hypothesis 7c. Thus, the (negative) effect of control provisions on intent to continue the 
relationship is mediated by goodwill-based (but not competence-based) trust. 
Hypothesis 8a predicted that coordination provisions would positively influence intent to 
continue. Hypotheses 8b and 8c predicted that goodwill-based trust (8b) and competence-based 
trust (8c) would mediate this effect. Consistent with Hypothesis 8a, we find (Table 3, Model 4c) 
that the higher the level of coordination provisions, the higher the likelihood of continuing the 
relationship after a dispute (β = .77; p < 0.01). Since we have already established, in failing to 
support Hypothesis 4, that coordination provisions do not affect goodwill-based trust, we need 
not assess the role of goodwill-based trust as a mediator; Hypothesis 8b is not supported. The 
mediation prediction regarding competence-based trust (Hypothesis 8c), however, is supported: 
we have already shown that competence-based trust positively influences intent to continue the 
relationship. When we simultaneously include coordination provisions and competence-based 
trust as predictors of intent to continue (Table 3, Model 5b), competence-based trust remains a 
significant predictor (β = 11.90; p < 0.001), but coordination provisions does not (β = -.61; ns). 
This suggests full mediation, which a follow-up Sobel test confirms (z = 3.325; p < 0.001). Thus, 
the (positive) effect of coordination provisions on the intent to continue collaboration is mediated 
by competence-based (but not goodwill-based) trust. 
For completeness, as a final analysis (Table 3, Model 5c), we simultaneously included 
both IVs (coordination and control provisions) and both MVs (competence- and goodwill-based 
trust) as predictors of intent to continue. Both mediators remain marginally significant predictors 
of intent to continue (β = 19.38; p < 0.01 and β = 14.96; p < 0.01). Also consistent with 
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predictions, coordination provisions is no longer significant (β = .46, ns). Meanwhile, control 
provisions continues to have a marginally significant direct negative effect on intent to continue 
(β = -1.45; p < 0.10), which suggests that control provisions may negatively influence the intent 
to continue in ways that are not fully accounted for by the effects of control provisions on trust. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------- 
DISCUSSION 
We sought to extend theorizing and empiricism by distinguishing between the control and 
coordination functions of contracts, and between goodwill-based and competence-based 
dimensions of trust judgments. Prior research on the effects of contracts on trust has focused 
primarily on the control function of contracts and the goodwill dimension of trust judgments. 
Less attention has been paid to the coordination function of contracts; the competence dimension 
of trust has been largely ignored. We find, consistent with those who have argued that contracts 
“crowd out” trust (e.g., Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002) that the greater the number of control-
oriented provisions, the lower the subsequent level of goodwill-based trust. In addition, 
consistent with those who perceive a more complementary relationship between contracts and 
trust (e.g., Lazzarini, Miller, & Zenger, 2004; Poppo & Zenger, 2002), we find that increases in 
control provisions as well as increases in coordination provisions lead to higher levels of 
competence-based trust. Thus, our more nuanced approach to analyzing contracts and trust 
reveals that seemingly divergent conclusions in prior research are not necessarily incompatible.  
 The current investigation also addresses the scarcity of research on the effects of 
contractual governance on performance and relational outcomes (e.g., Argyres et al., 2007; 
Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Our findings indicate that contract design affects the degree of trust that 
exists after a conflict has arisen, and, through this, the likelihood of relationship continuance. In 
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particular, control provisions have a negative effect on the willingness to continue a damaged 
relationship, and this effect is mediated by goodwill-based trust. Although control provisions 
enhance perceptions of competence, and, high levels of competence-based trust increase the 
likelihood of continued collaboration, competence-based trust does not act as a mediator in the 
relationship between control provisions and the intent to continue collaboration. Whereas prior 
research has argued that control mechanisms can diminish goodwill-based trust (e.g., Malhotra & 
Murnighan, 2002), ours is the first to document (a) the effects of control mechanisms on the 
willingness to continue a relationship and (b) the mediating role of goodwill-based trust in this 
relationship. Furthermore, although perceptions of competence do not mediate the effects of 
control on collaboration, ours is the first study to empirically document a positive relationship 
between (control provisions in) contracts and competence-based trust.   
We also find that coordination provisions increase the likelihood of continued 
collaboration after a dipute, and that this effect is mediated by perceptions of competence. While 
prior research has predicted a relationship between coordination and continued collaboration 
(Argyres et al., 2007; Mayer & Argyres, 2004), ours is the first empirical study to identify a 
mechanism—enhanced perceptions of competence—that underlies this relationship. Contrary to 
predictions, we did not find an effect of coordination provisions on goodwill-based trust. 
Theoretical Implications 
The results yield a number of theoretical implications that build upon and clarify prior 
research. Our study extends TCE-based research (e.g., Barthélemy & Quélin, 2006; Reuer & 
Ariño, 2002) by showing that firm decisions regarding contractual governance structures should 
consider not only (a) transaction attributes (as proposed by the TCE perspective; Sampson, 2004; 
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Williamson, 1985), and (b) existing levels of trust (e.g., Gulati, 1995a), but also (c) the effect of 
contract choices on subsequent trust and commitment (cf., Puranam & Vanneste, 2009). 
Another important implication of our results concerns the simultaneity with which 
contracts can produce positive and negative effects. Previously, Vlaar (2008: 18) has argued:  
“The relationship between contracting and interorganizational performance is likely to 
follow a curve-linear path, where too little contracting gives rise to chaos and destructive 
or opportunistic behaviour and where too much contracting causes rigidity and curbs 
creativeness and entrepreneurial activities (Foss et al. 2007; Luo, 2002; Mintzberg, 1994; 
Sampson, 2004a). In this respect, Mintzberg (1994: 386) notes that ‘formalization is a 
double-edged sword, easily reaching the point where help becomes hindrance.’” 
While this logic suggests that there may be an optimal level of contracting, our results suggest 
otherwise, at least as far as control provisions are concerned. We find that an increase in control 
provisions will decrease goodwill-based trust and increase competence-based trust, suggesting 
that an optimal contract will not be found by discovering the “point where help becomes 
hindrance,” but by appreciating inherent trade-offs and evaluating the priorities of the current 
relationship. Future research that studies whether it is possible to avoid such trade-offs—e.g., by 
mitigating the effects of control on goodwill-based trust—would be of significant value. 
Finally, the current research suggests that future work on the effects of contractual 
governance should seek to include outcome measures as well as mediator variables. In our 
complete model, for example, we find that our mediator, goodwill-based trust, accounts for 
some, but not all of the effects of control provisions on the intent to continue collaboration, thus 
raising additional questions regarding the mechanisms underlying these relationships.  
Managerial Implications 
The current investigation also has implications for managers who are tasked with the 
responsibility of mitigating relationship risks. By distinguishing between control and 
coordination provisions (rather than relying on standard measures of contractual complexity, 
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such as length or detail; Joskow, 1987; Pirrong, 1993), we are able to to advocate for an increase 
in coordination provisions as a means of building competence-based trust in anticipation of 
conflict. Consistent with this, a South Asian executive recently explained to one of the authors 
that he refuses to do business with any U.S. firm unless the firm contractually agrees to sending 
each new project manager to his city and on a car ride from the airport to his manufacturing 
facility; the facility is 18 kilometers from the airport, but requires 3 hours of travel. “Because if 
the managers have not done that, they do not understand how things work here—and the next 
time something goes wrong, they think it is because we are incompetent.”  
The results regarding control give pause and suggest that optimal decisions regarding 
contract structure require an assessment of the key sources of vulnerability in the relationship. If 
the relationship is likely to evolve, and it is difficult to predict the kinds of vulnerabilities that 
will emerge over time—as is often the case when negotiating contracts at the outset of a long-
term JV, or among partners in a start-up environment—goodwill-based trust is likely to be 
critical and managers might choose to reduce the emphasis on control and increase the emphasis 
on coordination. If competence-based trust is critical, as in relationships where one or both of the 
parties are providing technically or operationally complex services, managers might increase 
reliance not only on coordination provisions (which is obvious), but also on control provisions.  
 Managers might also take note that while 29 percent of disputes in our sample—all of 
which had escalated to the point where law firms were involved—were resolved with the parties 
intending to continue collaborating, contract structure influenced whether the relationship could 
be revived. Relationships were more likely to survive when they contained fewer control 
provisions and more coordination provisions. This suggests that if parties anticipate future 
conflict—e.g., in cross-cultural relationships—they might choose contracting structures that, 
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while sub-optimal in some ways (e.g., for minimizing risk via control), are better able to 
encourage trust development in the relationship (through an increase in coordination provisions). 
This highlights another insight for managers to appreciate: the types of contracts that are best at 
avoiding conflict may not be the most helpful in situations where conflict was not avoided. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 A number of limitations of the current research can be identified. First, we focus on only 
one type of outcome variable (relationship continuance). Research on other performance 
variables (e.g., profits) and relational variables (e.g., partner satisfaction) would be of clear 
benefit. Second, as with any such analysis, it is impossible to fully ensure that the results of our 
analyses support precisely the causal relationships we have predicted. The longitudinal nature of 
our data, our control variables, and our numerous robustness checks help mitigate these 
concerns, but future research using experimental designs would nicely complement the current 
investigation. Third, while our empirical approach suggests a clear distinction between control 
and coordination provisions, we acknowledge that some provisions may simultaneously 
accomplish both objectives. To address this concern, we (a) revised the coding scheme that was 
derived from existing research with the help of legal experts, and (b) conducted two separate 
robustness checks. Future research could extend our approach by seeking other methods of 
evaluating the coordination vs. control functions of contracts. 
This study sought to conceptually refine and empirically extend previous work on the 
effect of contracts on trust and trust-related outcomes in inter-organizational relationships. The 
findings provide a more nuanced understanding of these issues, as well as unique and actionable 
theoretical and managerial insights. We hope future research that builds on the strengths of our 
approach, and overcomes the weaknesses herein admitted, will be aided by this investigation. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Variables Mean Min. Max. S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  10 11 12 13 
1. Intent to continue .284 0 1 .45              
2. Control provisions 2.30 0 4 .90 -.139             
3. Coordination provisions .99 0 2 .89 .397* -.117            
4. Goodwill-based trust .22 0 .666 .16 .788* -.166 .214*           
5. Competence-based trust .261 0 .8 .22 .600* .240* .686* .476*          
6. Asymmetry 7.66 5.17 10.28 .96 .007 .047 -.023 .037 -.083         
7. Type of conflict .32 0 1 .47 .028 -.023 .148 .012 .163 .008        
8. Settlement type .40 0 1 .49 .458* .122 .098 .576* .366* .141 -.054       
9. Negative prior ties .127 0 1 .33 -.110 -.193 .070 -.125 -.200* .227* -.075 -.253*      
10. Positive prior ties .166 0 1 .37 .009 -.004 .004 .022 .034 .034 -.084 .169 -.170     
11. Prior relationship length 1.80 0 8.63 2.94 -.087 -.146 .018 -.076 -.168 .152 -.130 -.076 .641* .593*    
12. Revisions .22 0 4 .72 .133 .328* .154 .134 .209 .127 -.099 .213* -.037 .114 .075   
13. Asymmetry of alternatives 1.18 0 5 1.27 -.075 .104 -.102 -.068 .000 .093 -.084 -.135 .059 -.106 -.042 -.024  
14. Sum of alternatives 1.51 0 8 1.65 .025 .091 -.049 -.055 .337 .030 -.001 -.149 .040 -.013 -.009 -.048 .826* 
 
* p < 0.05 
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TABLE 2 
The Effect of Control vs. Coordination Provisions on Goodwill- and Competence-Based Trust 
 
 Type of trust 
 
 Goodwill-based 
 
Competence-based 
 Model 
1a 
Model 
1b 
Model 
1c 
Model 
1d 
Model 
2a 
Model 
2b 
Model 
2c 
Model 
2d 
Independent variables         
Control provisions 
 
 -.053*** 
(.013) 
 -.050*** 
(.013) 
 .036† 
(.020) 
 .064*** 
(.014) 
Coordination provisions 
 
  .030† 
(.015) 
.022 
(.014) 
  .158*** 
(.015) 
.168*** 
(.014) 
Control variables         
Asymmetry 
 
-.008 
(.014) 
-.006 
(.015) 
-.005 
(.014) 
-.003 
(.015) 
-.037 
(.023) 
-.039† 
(.023) 
-.021 
(.016) 
-.022 
(.014) 
Type of conflict 
 
.014 
(.028) 
.013 
(.027) 
.004 
(.029) 
.006 
(.027) 
.083† 
(.042) 
.0830† 
(.042) 
.032 
(.035) 
.030 
(.032) 
Settlement type 
 
.207*** 
(.036) 
.209*** 
(.034) 
.201*** 
(.035) 
.205*** 
(.033) 
.165** 
(.047) 
.163** 
(.048) 
.133*** 
(.028) 
.128*** 
(.028) 
Negative prior ties 
 
-.018 
(.106) 
-.052 
(.106) 
-.065 
(.100) 
-.084 
(.101) 
.220 
(.284) 
.243 
(.276) 
-.025 
(.184) 
-.000 
(.164) 
Positive prior ties 
 
-.063 
(.082) 
-.077 
(.088) 
-.093 
(.074) 
-.098 
(.081) 
.189 
(.239) 
.198 
(.231) 
.034 
(.157) 
.041 
(.137) 
Prior relationship length 
 
.004 
(.013) 
.005 
(.013) 
.010 
(.012) 
.009 
(.012) 
-.038 
(.038) 
-.039 
(.037) 
-.011 
(.025) 
-.010 
(.022) 
Revisions 
 
.006 
(.020) 
.027 
(.019) 
-.000 
(.019) 
.021 
(.018) 
.058* 
(.026) 
.044† 
(.026) 
.023 
(.019) 
-.004 
(.018) 
Asymmetry of alternatives 
 
-.007 
(.019) 
-.005 
(.019) 
-.005 
(.019) 
-.004 
(.019) 
-.025 
(.022) 
-.027 
(.022) 
-.012 
(.016) 
-.014 
(.015) 
Sum of alternatives 
 
.008 
(.015) 
.011 
(.014) 
.008 
(.015) 
.010 
(.014) 
.036† 
(.018) 
.035† 
(.018) 
.032** 
(.012) 
.029* 
(.012) 
Constant 
 
.199† 
(.115) 
.298* 
(.117) 
.151 
(.115) 
.257* 
(.116) 
.429* 
(.174) 
.362† 
(.167) 
.181 
(.121) 
.045 
(.120) 
R2 .345 .416 .368 .428 .276 .294 .644 .701 
 
N = 102; † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses; clustering on firms (# of clusters = 76). 
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TABLE 3 
The Effect of Control and Coordination Provisions on the Intent to Continue in the Relationships 
 
 Intent to continue 
 
 Model 
3a 
Model 
3b 
Model 
3c 
Model 
3d 
Model 
4a 
Model 
4b 
Model 
4c 
Model 
5a 
Model 
5b 
Model 
5c 
Independent variables           
Control provisions 
 
    -.624* 
(.249) 
 -.628** 
(.224) 
-.159 
(.282) 
-2.119*** 
(.519) 
-1.455† 
(.758) 
Coordination provisions 
 
     .789** 
(.230) 
.774** 
(.244) 
1.135* 
(.455) 
-.614 
(.374) 
.466 
(.606) 
Goodwill-based trust 
 
 10.597*** 
(1.474) 
 17.079*** 
(4.444) 
   12.936*** 
(1.908) 
 19.384** 
(6.033) 
Competence-based trust 
 
  4.645*** 
(.899) 
9.458** 
(2.733) 
    11.907*** 
(3.019) 
14.969** 
(5.542) 
Control variables           
Asymmetry 
 
-.131 
(.144) 
-.111 
(.246) 
-.022 
(.168) 
-.002 
(.255) 
-.140 
(.162) 
-.092 
(.149) 
-.118 
(.164) 
-.111 
(.209) 
-.147 
(.204) 
-.020 
(.235) 
Type of conflict 
 
.097 
(.307) 
-.089 
(.431) 
-.363 
(.356) 
-.849 
(.519) 
.167 
(.306) 
-.121 
(.334) 
-.040 
(.338) 
-.236 
(.459) 
-.414 
(.456) 
-1.273 
(.949) 
Settlement type 
 
1.530*** 
(.329) 
.307 
(.533) 
1.217** 
(.385) 
-.221 
(.732) 
1.791*** 
(.375) 
1.685*** 
(.446) 
1.938*** 
(.494) 
.215 
(.688) 
2.081** 
(.613) 
.344 
(1.162) 
Negative prior ties 
 
.273 
(1.435) 
1.022 
(1.499) 
-.121 
(1.163) 
1.079 
(1.545) 
-.002 
(1.655) 
-.679 
(1.280) 
-.825 
(1.434) 
.105 
(1.487) 
1.529 
(1.475) 
1.741 
(1.730) 
Positive prior ties 
 
-.315 
(1.156) 
.420 
(1.199) 
-.925 
(1.010) 
.163 
(1.256) 
-.451 
(1.353) 
-1.058 
(1.076) 
-1.120 
(1.206) 
-.112 
(1.194) 
-.601 
(1.068) 
.137 
(1.478) 
Prior relationship length 
 
-.020 
(.184) 
-.123 
(.207) 
.102 
(.160) 
.010 
(.222) 
-.041 
(.221) 
.096 
(.170) 
.054 
(.195) 
-.051 
(.202) 
-.184 
(.219) 
-.152 
(.254) 
Revisions 
 
.119 
(.195) 
.056 
(.208) 
-.168 
(.186) 
-1.354* 
(.557) 
.441 
(.222) 
.043 
(.173) 
.311 
(.206) 
-.216 
(.272) 
.670* 
(.269) 
-1.140† 
(.668) 
Asymmetry of alternatives 
 
-.398† 
(.227) 
-.748** 
(.266) 
-.368 
(.264) 
-.457 
(.343) 
-.350 
(.225) 
-.390 
(.277) 
-.325 
(.272) 
-.621† 
(.318) 
-.192 
(.310) 
-.252 
(.370) 
Sum of alternatives 
 
.344* 
(.167) 
.553** 
(.180) 
.242 
(.212) 
.254 
(.204) 
.370* 
(.159) 
.386† 
(.216) 
.392† 
(.207) 
.510† 
(.248) 
.111 
(.246) 
.208 
(.289) 
Constant 
 
-.404 
(1.147) 
-2.619 
(1.831) 
-2.182 
(1.474) 
-6.529** 
(2.489) 
.776 
(1.397) 
-1.602 
(1.286) 
-.226 
(1.511) 
-3.881* 
(1.898) 
1.339 
(1.813) 
-6.544* 
(2.782) 
Pseudo R2 .235 .657 .438 .766 .312 .366 .425 .758 .652 .833 
Wald χ2 26.90 81.73 43.64 39.82 33.11 23.60 31.37 96.73 28.85 58.73 
 
N = 102; † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses; clustering on firms (# of clusters = 76). 
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APPENDIX A 
Examples of Statements Coded as Competence- vs. Goodwill-Based Trust 
 
Response categories were derived from definitions of trust dimensions in Davis, 
Schoorman, Mayer, & Tan (2000), Mayer & Davis (1999), Mayer et al. (1995), and Schoorman, 
Mayer, & Davis (2007). 
Competence-Based Trust: Messages were coded for references to skills, competencies, 
aptitude, training, and/or experience. 
 Examples: 
“We know that you are able to do it properly.” 
“Usually you deliver it on time.” 
“My engineers told me that they are confident about your experience in the […] field.” 
“You manifested your high level of competence during Phase 1 of the Project.” 
Goodwill-Based Trust: Messages were coded for references to benevolence and/or integrity.  
Benevolence Examples: 
“We know you want the success of this Project.” 
“We really appreciated your technicians’ efforts to repair the damage during the night.” 
“Your employees have been kind and friendly to help [Firm A] to face this issue.” 
Integrity Examples: 
“So far, you have been fair and honest.” 
“[Firm B] is well known for respecting its employees. It is what gives you a great 
reputation!” 
“You have moral principles and I like that.”  
